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Introduct ion: Beyond IT 
In 2002 during my first fieldwork trip to Bangalore, I met Nandan Nilekani, then the chief executive officer and one of the founders of Infosys Limited, the site of my fieldwork.! He argued that the best evidence of the emergence 
of India as a "powerhouse" is visible when software engineers migrate to the 
West. He presented a particular vignette: "When my boys go to the u.s. to 
work on a client site, they go through the immigration process with pride be-
cause even the immigration officer knows that he is not there to work at a gas 
station or a convenience store. He is there because the u.s. needs him to pro-
gram software for them." The skewed gender and class nature of the vignette 
aside, what this points to is the emergence of a new nationalistic narrative. 
Such narratives were also palpable in the IT company I worked with, 
which was headquartered in Princeton, New Jersey, with an offshore office 
in Hyderabad, in the southern Indian state of Andhra Pradesh. The majority 
of the software engineers and developers were Indian, mostly on H -IB work 
visas from India. When my Indian colleagues learned about my research 
topic, they encouraged me by pointing out that I was doing something "valu-
able" for our country. They collectively agreed that if there is "one thing" of 
phenomenal importance in India now, it is the rise of the Indian information 
technology (IT) industry on the global scene. They were also gratified that 
software engineers like them would be at the center of my work. One notion 
l. Infosys, one of the leading IT companies in India, was established in 1981 and earned 
$8 .25 billion in revenue in FY 2014. 
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that seemed to consistently underscore these preliminary conversations was 
that the IT industry flourished in a country otherwise relegated to underde-
velopment, poverty, hunger, and corruption. Therefore, it is especially impor-
tant that such success be celebrated and owned as a national pride. 
It is rather interesting to note that the "pride" is primarily based on de-
rivative work; that is, the majority of software development is designed to 
support the business processes of corporations in the West. The Indian IT 
industry has little to do with innovative work or program development. For 
instance, at the time of my fieldwork, Infosys had only one product, Finacle, 
developed for banking solutions. In February 2014 Infosys set up a subsidiary, 
EdgeVerve Systems, to concentrate its products, platforms, and solutions. The 
products and platforms currently account for only 5.2 percent of the $8.2 bil-
lion of the revenue of the company.2 When I wanted Nandan Nilekani to ex-
plain the dearth of investment in products, he mentioned that the company's 
expertise lies in software development, and that is what Infosys is known to do 
well . In this context, Xiang Biao's Global Body Shopping examines a possibly 
unique Indian practice called "body shopping" in the IT trade between India 
and other countries, especially in the West. Body shopping is a practice where 
"an Indian-run consultancy (body shop) anywhere in the world recruits IT 
workers, in most cases from India, to be placed out as project-based labor 
with different clients" (Biao 2007: 4).3 While Infosys is no longer a primar-
ily body-shopping company, this practice lends perspective to the Indian IT 
industry in the global context. As Biao argues, it is noticeable that software 
development is also premised on low-priced, English-speaking labor available 
in India. These kinds of global practices are inherently produced through 
the realignment of historic unequal global relations. Second, the IT process 
rather than embedding Indian IT professionals in the global circuit in effect 
makes them more vulnerable, hence dis embedding them.4 
. 2. "Infosys Hives Off Products BUSiness into Separate Unit," Times ofllldia, May 12, 2014, 
avalla ble at http://timesofindia .i ndiati mes .com/tech/tech -news/! nfosys-hives-off-prod ucts-busi 
ness-tnto-separate-unit/articleshow/34989367.cms (accessed September 26, 2014). 
3: For a detailed discussion about the rise of the Indian IT industry in the national and in-
ternatlOnal perspective, see Heeks (1996), Kumar (2001), Lakha (1990, 1994), Lateef (1996) , Par-
thasarathy (2004), Saxenian (2000), and Upadhya (2004). 
4. A conversation about the importance of innovation to sustain the Indian IT industry in 
the global market is slowly emerging, led by the National Association for Software and Services 
Compantes (NASSCOM), the trade association for the industry. This is partly fueled by the eco-
nomic dow~,turn and partly by other countries rising as software development destinations. For 
detaIls, see Innovation-A Call for Action for the IT/BPM Industry," available at http://www 
.nasscom.in/sites/default/files/uploads/mailers/2013/CEO_Forum_Decoding_Innovation_ Post 
- eve2 t_24052 013/docs/Decoding_Innovation_1 7 May20 1 3 _Synopsis.pd f (accessed October 2014); 
and InnovatlOn Transforming the Growth Landscape: Capitalizing IP in Indian IT/BPM," avail-
able at http://www.kpmg.comIIN/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Documents/lnno 
vatlOn-Transforming-the-growth_landscape.pdf (accessed October 2014). 
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Notwithstanding the shallow foundation on which the pride of Indian 
IT is based, the narratives are nonetheless vital ethnographic data. It is my 
argument that the IT pride is not limited to economics alone. It further, and 
perhaps more importantly, incorporates a strong ethical dimension. My col-
leagues at work narrated the success of IT as an ethical watershed for the 
nation-state. Adjectives such as "honest," "good," "not corrupt," "reliable," 
"educated," "good background," and so on, were often evoked to describe 
IT professionals, especially high-profile entrepreneurs.s For a country, espe-
cially the state, generally known to engage in corrupt practices, where global 
business would not venture easily, things changed with IT; they argued, "We 
have become more trustworthy as a country." In this view, the IT industry 
has carved out an ethical space that is distinct from and in disdain of the 
"corrupt" state. Two words that I encountered ceaselessly, which, as software 
professionals often reminded me, were at the core of global corporate gover-
nance and the market ideals, were "accountability" and "transparency." The 
market rhetoric therefore goes beyond sheer economics; it is also a normative 
tool that ensures uncompromising honesty in economic transactions. 
What does an ethnography of neoliberalism look like? This book is an ef-
fort in that direction. It is about the narratives, discursive practices, and con-
testations through which a neoliberal critique of public governance emerges, 
thickens, and is also subverted in contemporary India. The critique plausibly 
emanated with the success of the IT industry, but, as I demonstrate, it is more 
importantly a politically and ethically negotiated narrative that coalesced 
over time to become an identifying account mainly of the urban middle 
class. I emphaSize the class characteristic of the narrative to show how, on one 
hand, neoliberalism privileges the middle class, and, on the other hand, also 
provokes a different kind of politics of rights among the urban poor. I argue 
for a constitutive relationship between the ideology of the IT industry and the 
emerging neoliberal ideology of the polity without privileging either. Hence, 
my attention here is on Simultaneity rather than on causality. Simultaneity 
compels us to look beyond boundaries, of IT in this case, to explore sites 
that are now being folded into the neoliberal schema. This book is therefore 
also about going beyond IT. The "beyond" in this instance is a water project, 
known as the Greater Bangalore Water and Sewerage Project (GBWASP; 
henceforth, Water Project), that would not only privatize water supply but 
also required a beneficiary capital contribution from citizens, often referred 
to as "customers." Water offers us the kind of "beyond" that unsettles the 
otherwise euphoric national narrative ofIT. This "beyond" corroborates that 
the narrative is inherently embedded within and asymmetrically privileges 
the middle and upper-middle classes. 
5. Smitha Radhakrishnan examines "background " in deta il as a key word in the IT industry; 
she argues that the term oscillates between "claim to universali ty and relativity" (2011: 8). 
.. 
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In this newfound basis of class politics, belonging in the nation-state is 
once again fractured into bits, simultaneously familiar and unfamiliar. Bits 
in its metaphorical extension-BITS, as in the digital vernacular-is a binary, 
it takes the value of either 1 or O. Binary digits store information and are the 
basic unit of communication in computing. A logical value of 1 is considered 
a true statement, and 0 is a false statement. The market paradigm post-1991 is 
parallel to the 1 BIT as the logically true statement. It leaves the other existing 
option, the socialist-redistributive model, 0, as a false choice. In a modernist 
model such as this, the choice is obvious, legible, and privileged. Thus one 
gradually ceases to belong to the nation-state as a citizen based solely on 
birthright. Belonging is based on an active participation in the market and 
also in accepting the market as the only viable option for the polity to prosper. 
In another sense, it is the acceptance of the logical value 1 as the true state-
ment of the BIT and discarding 0 as obsolete. 
I gathered success stories through ethnographic work with IT profession-
als in Bangalore, the Silicon Valley ofIndia, and collectively call them the "IT 
narrative." The establishment of an Indian industry in the knowledge econ-
omy otherwise dominated by the West had an effect beyond fiscal reports. 
It has instilled a sense of confidence among the IT professionals that they 
can now offer better leadership to the country based on their experience of 
competing and succeeding on a global scale. My analyses of the success nar-
rative of the IT industry generated the following set of values and principles 
espoused by entrepreneurs and software engineers. First, the IT industry in 
India succeeded not merely for the software knowledge and English-language 
skills available in the country but also because the IT companies meticulously 
adhered to the ethical corporate practices stipulated by global capital. Second, 
~he success of IT offers a blueprint for governance, which can and should 
mform both private and pUblic sectors. Third, the success narrative has lifted 
India from its enduring status as a poor developing country, and this op-
portunity ought to be utilized for a nationwide governance and institutional 
reform, especially for the state. Fourth, the reforms can be effective by incor-
porating citizens, who believe in the power of the market as a transformative 
tool, within the public administrative apparatus. 
Together, I term the above set of values the ethico-political ideology of 
the IT industry to emphasize its ethical nature, but also to indicate how 
the emergent set of ethics has established a new politics of belonging to the 
nation-state. While this book deciphers the cultural drivers and historical 
contingencies that underscore and manufacture the IT narrative, more im-
portantly it problematizes the cohesiveness and legitimacy of the narrative it-
self. The apparent tidiness of the narrative intrigued me for two reasons: first, 
its seemingly unproblematic passage from the economic/corporate/capitalist 
to the social/public governance realm. I ask what enables these successful 
corporate entrepreneurs to offer gUidelines for renewing the nation, which 
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has two distinct domains-one relies on the market, the other on a fictive 
bond connected by birth and land. The question is not only about the passage 
of this narrative but also what makes IT possible at this particular historical 
juncture. Second, and I think more importantly, when we realize that the IT 
success narrative is one primarily of and by the middle class, it starts to fray at 
the edges. How does one account for class differences in a narrative that favors 
the market ideology? How does one understand the disenfranchisement of the 
poorer sections of the citizenry who are unable to participate in the market 
paradigm of change? What kind of class politics does this narrative provoke 
and suppress? In other words, who becomes the privileged citizen of the na-
tion is now a question of whether one is "inside" or "outside" IT. 
The inside and outside, as I show in this work, does not necessarily mean 
that one is employed in the IT industry. Relatively, it is an indication of an 
ideological divide of those who share and participate in the market ideals 
and those who do not, or rather cannot. Using ideology to depict the set of 
values is at once a simple and a difficult task. Linking this ethico-political 
narrative to the middle-class and upper-middle-class IT entrepreneurs and 
professionals is to suggest that ideology is "a system of beliefs characteristic 
of a particular class or group" (Williams 1977: 55). 
In the Marxian sense, ideology arises out of the material processes that 
organize economic relations, but it is nonetheless a "false consciousness." En-
gels explained, "Ideology is a process accomplished by the so-called thinker, 
consciously indeed but with a false consciousness. The real motives impel-
ling him remain unknown to him, otherwise it would not be an ideological 
process at all" (quoted in Williams 1977: 65). Raymond Williams has argued 
that the separation of the consciousness as a "reflective" or a "second" stage 
poses a difficult problem for conceptualizing ideology since consciousness 
itself, he argues, is formed through material social processes (Williams 1977). 
While Marx underscored the importance of material and social history that 
enhanced the concept of ideology, moving it beyond scientific empiricism 
proposed by Destutt de Tracy, his negation of "what men say" and "men as 
narrated" or from language itself, as Williams contended, created an endur-
ing conceptual uncertainty (Williams 1977). In emphasizing the IT narrative, 
I draw attention to ideology not only as emerging from the material social 
relations of software development, a process that spans the globe, but also 
what the IT entrepreneurs say and how they are being narrated, for instance, 
by the media, as the harbingers of the neoliberal market. Finally, how does 
language come to delineate the new set of values and principles or, in other 
words, the IT ideology? 
In the context of a class analysis, a couple of characteristics are unique 
to the IT industry in India: First, its emergence independent of the older 
business model that was linked to family businesses or established corpora-
tions; second, the educated middle class, who were the main founders of IT 
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companies, drew on their social capital to establish a different corporate norm 
(Upadhya 2004). Both these characteristics were reflected in the narrative 
alongside class privilege. Further, Leela Fernandes has argued that there is 
a need to move beyond the obvious contribution scholars have made either 
"estimating the size of the middle class" or "analyz[ing] the middle class 
through the lens of consumption" (2006: xvii) . Fernandes instead explores the 
political routes through which an entrenched connection among the middle 
class, consumption practices, and liberalization evolve while simultaneously 
. rguing that the middle class is not a monolith. 
Fernandes's invitation is useful because it leads us to look at processes 
through which the middle class garners, retains, and normalizes emergent 
ideologies and practices. Therefore, what troubled me about the connection 
that I heard being formulated among IT professionals, IT's middle-class 
proponents, and the nation-state was twofold. First, the narrative leap: If IT 
benefits the educated urban middle class, somehow it will be beneficial for 
India as a whole. Second, related to this, the high acoustics of the IT narra-
tive was drowning out issues of inequality that were being introduced by the 
same 1990s liberalization policies that enabled the ascent of IT. Where do 
people from the lower social economic strata find their place in this changing 
economic terrain? Or, seen from a slightly different angle, if IT contributes 
9.5 percent to the GDP,6 how does it become relevant for the entire nation 
relative to others sector with higher contributions, for instance, the manu-
facturing sector (15.2 percent in 2012-2013)t Moreover, even though the 
IT entrepreneurs I knew at Infosys upheld the class mobility offered by the 
industry, the education and soft skills one needed to secure a job in IT were 
middle-class privileges. Consequently, as I started this work in 2002, it soon 
became apparent that to tell the "success" story ofIndian IT, one had to move 
"outside" the industry. 
The resulting matter that arises here is relationship among IT, the state, 
and neoliberalism. Would IT succeed without neoliberal state policies? Per-
haps. Does the visibility ofIT exclusively rest on a "failing" state? This ques-
tion demands a more nuanced exploration. The contradistinction erected 
between the ethics of the IT narrative and the "corruption" of the state cannot 
be simply relegated to the chronological "failure" of the state and the "success" 
of IT; neither can we see the latter merely as a direct outcome of the former. 
Rather, the field of possibility within which the IT narrative rose and gained 
traction has to do with the confluence of global and national processes that 
began propagating the market over socialist-redistributive state agendas. 
. 6 . NASSCOM, "Impact on India's Growth," available at http: //www. nasscom.in/impact 
-mdlas-growth (accessed April 6, 2015). 
7. Available at http://articles.economictimes. indiatimes.com12013- 05-12/news/39203854_1 
_assocham-survey-100-million-jobs-manufactur ing_sector (accessed May 10, 2013). 
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Undoubtedly, the Indian state, especially under the leadership of the Congress 
Party, has had a protracted and legendary scale of corruption, but to argue 
that IT's visibility solely depended on this is to miss the larger forces of neo-
liberal change that are sweeping the globe. The 2014 election is a case in point. 
The Congress Party lost the elections by a significant margin to the Bharatiya 
Janata Party (BJP); Nandan Nilekani, who ran for office on the Congress 
ticket, lost. There are local- and state-level distinctions of electoral politics in 
India, but it is also important to attend to neoliberal forces that increasingly 
undermine the legitimacy of the state as suitable for public governance. There-
fore, this book does not argue for causality between the "success" of IT and 
the "failure" of the state. Instead it is an invitation to examine the complexity 
of neoliberalism, especially in India starting in the 1990s. 
N eoliberalism as a concept is neither succinct nor analytically constant. There is also the accompanying intellectual dread that while neoliberal-
ism could be a useful concept to capture the field of possibility, it may also 
be diluted as a mere placeholder in contemporary anthropological research.s 
In a 2014 Annual Review of Anthropology article, Tejaswini Ganti identifies 
two ways in which anthropologists have primarily used neoliberalism: "one is 
concerned with poliCies and politics and the other with ideologies and values" 
(Ganti 2014: 94). I find David Harvey's formulation of neoliberalism especially 
helpful for my analysis here because it underscores the coupling of values and 
ideals within the public institutional framework. 
Harvey writes: 
Neoliberalism is in the first instance a theory of political economic 
practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced 
by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within 
an institutional framework characterized by strong private property 
rights,free market and free trade. The role of the state is to create and 
preserve an institutional framework appropriate to such practices. 
(2007: 2)9 
As we can see, freedom here does not quite relate to a democratic man-
date and citizens' rights. Instead it is tied to the unfettered possibility of 
8. In January 2013 the University of Manchester Group of Debates in Anthropological Theory 
discussed a motion titled "The Concept ofNeoliberalism Has Become an Obstacle to the Anthro-
pological Understanding of the Twenty-First Century." Interestingly the final vote went for support 
of the concept (Ganti 2014). Available at http://www.talkinganthropology.com/2013/01118/ta45 
-gdatl-neoliberalisml! (accessed October 6, 2014). 
9. Emphasis mine. 
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securing private property, where the state enables a market' structure that 
privileges the already privileged. "Freedom," as Harri Englund notes, "is an 
essentially contested concept. Philosophical debates aside, the exportation of 
'freedom' across historical periods and geopolitical areas have given the terlXl 
new meanings, which are often ill-understood by those who have a specific 
agenda to pursue" (2006: 2) . This idea of freedom, in addition, creates a neVv" 
subjectivity that dissociates from the collective to settle on the individual as 
its point of reference. Nikolas Rose has written that "freedom is the name We 
give today to a kind of power one brings to bear upon oneself, and bringing 
power to bear upon others ... and freedom is particularly problematic when 
we demand to be governed in its name" (1999: 96). This emergence has deep 
implications for a democratic regime since it signals, contrary to what some 
scholars have suggested, not the end of politics but a politics that is admissible 
only when filtered through a preset script of resistance and response. 
Ganti makes another valuable distinction, that is, between "late capital_ 
ism" and "neoliberalism," emphasizing two points of divergences. First, late 
capitalism is a chronological marker, whereas neoliberalism is an "ideological 
and philosophical movement ... that emerges at a particular historical mo_ 
ment" facilitated by network of intellectuals (Friedrich August von Hayek~ 
Walter Lippman, Milton Friedman, and others) and institutions (Mon. t 
Pelerin Society) (Ganti 2014: 91) . Second, neoliberalism is characterized by a 
call for a prescriptive arrangement between the state and its citizens to reOl:"_ 
ganize capital and property (Ganti 2014). Neoliberal futures are hence aspi_ 
rational and call for a discontinuity with past forms of welfare governance. 
The discontinuity is a normative stipulation for the market to masquerade as 
an impeccable logiC of well-being. Above all, I take seriously Ganti's (201'1) 
suggestion that neoliberalism as an analytical concept helps us ground ethno_ 
graphic work to think through processes of globalization that are otherwiSe 
diffuse and obscure. 
IT professionals demonstrated a high regard for the market rather tha~ 
the state as an underwriter for their well-being or, as they frequently eJ<;:_ 
pressed it, "the good life." They often presented private property they hact 
acquired, which was "unthinkable" for their parents, such as owning a flat by 
the time one was thirty, cars, high-end gadgets, shopping trips to the mall 
dining at eclectic restaurants, international vacations, and so on, as marker~ 
of their well-being. Still, I often noticed that the narratives of personal suc_ 
cess and possessions often elevated from the personal to the national level 
somewhat surreptitiously and quite naturally. The intertwining of individual 
biographies and the national trajectory indicated a deeper belief in the poten_ 
tial of the market to alleviate India from the stigma of being a poor country-. 
This, as Paul Treanor has suggested, reflects the "belief in the moral neceSSity 
of market forces in the economy, [and) is probably the first defining feature o:{" 
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market liberalism."lo In this sense, well-being as an experience was not neces-
sarily confined to the IT workers. It was seen as a possibility for the nation as 
a whole, realizable only through the state being invested in the mechanism 
of the market. 
On the other hand, it was quite remarkable to see that in nearly all the 
conversations about "accountability" and "transparency," seldom did anyone 
refer to its familiar humanistic merit. They were regularly cast in terms of 
corporate values and practices, which were also apparently new to Indians. 
I found it challenging to talk about these values in the famil iar humanist 
domain in my discussions. While most professionals I interviewed acknowl-
edged that these terms have long underscored collective life, they were reluc-
tant to see these values now outside the corporation. Part of the reason, some 
explained, is that with a balance sheet lurking at the end of every financial 
quarter, one can see the tangible results-profit and loss-and hence the 
moral urgency to be accountable and transparent. Others were skeptical that 
such values could even work outside the supervision mechanism of the mar-
ket, such as the " dashboard," which I discuss later, that companies like Infosys 
use to track project timelines and employees' productivity. In other words, the 
corporate governance paradigm was enumerative and protective. As Treanor 
reminds us, "Neoliberalism is not simply an economic structure, it is a phi-
losophy . . . neoliberals tend to see the world in terms of market metaphors."ll 
One manager at Infosys explained the global relevance of "accountabil-
ity" and "transparency" to me: "These could be daunting for people Who are 
used to corruption, but this is what we have embraced as Our core v 1 
11 "h . d" T h d a ues. This comes to us natura y, e .contmue . I as one an excellent job in 
showing that these values work m the global economy; otherWise why Id 
. . h US 7" N l'b I h wou big compallles m t e " come to us. eo I era c anges have recast the 
developing world since the 1990s, and India is not exceptional in thi d 
T · d " II " . h s regar . Nonetheless, the I m ustry natura y espousmg t ese values is a h 
. h ' fi 1 . h 1 h rat er 
Problematic statement m t at a speC! c c ass WIt wea t and financ ' I . . Ia power 
is claiming a set of values as propnetary. JulIa Elyachar begins her d ' . 
.". ISCUSSlOn 
ofneoliberalism by statmg, AnthropologIsts have a good reason to h 
'. ate neo-
liberalism" (201~: 76). However, rather than bla~l1~g neohberalism for all that 
h one astray m the contemporary world, she mVltes us to attend t th " 
as g 1 fl " 0 e po-
l't' 1 debates and conceptua con icts that underscore the present El I lca " yachar 
d Strates the departures between Hayek s formulation of neol'b . em on . . I erahsm 
d the ethnographIc work on the same Issue related to public infr an astructure 
A 'I~ http://web.inter.n l.net /users/PauI.Treanor/neolibera lism I 10. val . lim l (accessed 
March 27, 201 3) . UN I'b I' 0" Th D fi " " 
I Treanor eo I era Ism: ngllls, e~ry, e muon, available at h 11 Pall ' " ttp'!l 
, . I sers/Paul.Treanor/neohberalIsm.html, 9 (accessed April 6, 2015) . wWw.web 
.mter.n l.net LI . 
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in Cairo. She links the two through the concept of "tacit knowledge," some-
thing shared by anthropology and neoliberalism. Contrary to Hayek's argu-
ment that tacit knowledge can only be harnessed in the free market and stems 
from the public sector, Elyachar discovered the opposite in Cairo. Similar 
to Elyachar's demonstration of the fahlawah (street smarts or trickery) as 
important to the success of the public sector, state representatives working in 
the Bangalore slums often had to draw on the existing network of favors and 
vocabulary within the slum to convey the value of the project. Taken together 
the above theorizations signify the complexity of neoliberalism rather than it 
being a simple account of dispossession. Therefore, I document the struggles 
that are inherent in the social margins and the collective knowledge that is 
evoked, based on past experiences, to confront the powerful. 
A longside ."success," narratives of the "outside" were another related e.th-nographlC data I collected during my fieldwork. It was an expressIOn 
that IT workers habitually used to demarcate their lives and circumstances 
from those who continue to be external spectators of IT. The inside of IT is 
broader than the industry itself; it included the emerging middle classes who 
are participating in the neoliberal market in different professional capacities, 
such as in biotech, banking, real estate, and so on. IT in this sense stands as a 
metaphor for the arrival of the middle class. The outside comprises those who 
are unqualified to participate in or who are even undeserving of the "good 
life," mainly because of their economic dispossession, such as the "urban 
poor" in my research. The outside offers us an analytic opportunity to inter-
rogate the picture of change embraced by IT. Stated differently, rather than 
looking from outside IT, the outside is the window to look into IT. The IT 
entrepreneurs at Infosys assertively told me that their commitment to social 
change is not limited to the industry and is not even about the industry any 
longer; according to them, by the late 1990s the industry had established an 
"equitable" relationship with the state. The state, they stressed, was aware that 
supporting the IT industry was critical for India to gain global recognition. 
Therefore, Narayan Murthy (cofounder and chairman-emeritus of Infosys 
Limited), Nandan Nilekani, and others insisted that I definitely look "outside" 
IT, which is critical to their agenda of instituting market reforms in the state 
apparatus. In this sense, the outside is in fact not incidental or merely adja-
cent to the inside-that is, IT-but is at its core. Yet, what came across in my 
conversations at Infosys is that they perceived the outside as a homogeneous 
domain that is malleable and easily amenable to market transformations. 
Such a portrayal raised several questions. How does one account for the 
dichotomy between IT and the outside? And why is the outside necessarily 
perceived as "homogeneous"? What is at stake in this homogeneity when we 
think of a neoliberal schema? 
Introduction II 
The "outside" nonetheless posed an ethnographic challenge: What could 
be an ideal research site? As I was seeking a possible site, Infosys invited me 
to attend a citizens' meeting to discuss issues that are affecting city gover-
nance. They thought I would be interested because Nandan Nilekani was 
one of the key speakers. I initially interpreted Nilekani's involvement as a 
well-known denizen of the city. However, when I heard him speak that day, 
it was obvious that he was promoting the market ideals that would stream-
line governance and improve citizen engagement. He stressed the value of 
"accountability" and "transparency" while talking about a water project in 
the city. Both these values that have guided his experience with corporate 
governance, he argued, would be useful in organizing public governance, 
as well. He urged the audience to rethink their relationship with the state, 
particularly in relation to basic amenities such as water. Following this he 
mentioned an impending water project known as Greater Bangalore Water 
and Sewerage Project (Water Project) and the role of Janaagraha, a nongov-
ernmental organization (NGO). 
Janaagraha was organizing the citizens' participation component of the 
Water Project that involved monitoring and holding the state accountable 
for any delay and/or corruption. The Water and Sanitation Program of the 
World Bank was funding this component. In the brief window I found during 
lunch that day, I introduced myself to Ramesh Ramanathan, the cofounder 
of Janaagraha, along with his wife, Swati Ramanathan. In order to gain a 
sense of the "unique" work his NGO is involved in, Ramanathan invited me 
to attend the "Monday Morning Meetings" at his organization, where they 
present updates on the various projects. He assured me that ifI was interested 
in measuring change, his organization would be a good place since "we are a 
citizens' platform and work on re-engaging citizens with the state after a gap 
of five decades."12 Nilekani and Ramanathan had worked together as part of 
the Bangalore Agenda Task Force (BATF). The BATF was a public-private 
initiative founded by the then chief minister of Karnataka, S. M. Krishna, to 
reform urban governance in Bangalore. Therefore , like Nilekani, Ramanathan 
trusted the market as the only tool that can bring about substantive changes 
both in the way the state functions and how citizens can involve themselves 
in governance as "stakeholders" of the nation. The Water Project, he stressed, 
would be a useful area to study the renewed engagement between the state and 
the citizens. At the end he said, "We do not need to reinvent the wheel if the 
market has succeeded in every other area." Attending the citizens' meeting 
that day led me to my "outside" infrastructural site. 
12. At that time, the Ramanathans were reluctant to label Janaagraha as an NGO. TIley pre-
ferred to call it a "citizen's platform" to indicate its urban dimension and also to separate it from 
the developmental paradigm, which is often seen as the domain ofNGO work. I have discussed this 
active delinking that the urban middle class has embraced elsewhere (Dasgupta 201 2). 
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The study of infrastructure is not new but is developing as a more focused 
area of inquiry.13 In 2012 Cultural Anthropology curated a volume, which 
dwelt on how scholars have started theorizing the subject of infrastructure 
through ethnographic work.14 Theoretically this ranges from thinking of 
infrastructure as a "social-material assemblage" (Nikhil Anand) to how the 
ordinariness of infrastructure is "appropriated and recombined" by users 
(Jonathan Bach) and then how we can think of it through the mechanism of 
gift and reciprocity (Daniel Mains). Elyachar, on the other hand, is reluctant 
to theorize infrastructure yet because, she says, "At certain moments fuzzy 
concepts are more helpful to capture the number of interlinked issues."ls 
My own theorization of water supply as a question of infrastructure relates 
to the above positions, but I am also interested in water being the paradig-
matic case for the provision of basic amenities. Further, through this work, 
I underscore how the vocabulary of the market, such as transparency, rather 
ironically coincides with the nature of water.16 
The Water Project was designed by the United States Agency for Inter-
national Development (USAID) and primarily involved the privatization of 
water funded jOintly by the beneficiary citizen contribution, market bonds, 
mega city loan schemes, and the government of Karnataka. The continuity 
of the market narrative between IT and the Water Project was remarkably 
seamless and thorough as though they were identical areas of human life. 
Throughout my fieldwork I found it quite arduous to engage people both at 
Infosys and Janaagraha to attend to the specious similarities being drawn 
between IT, a capitalist enterprise, and water, a basic and sacred amenity. 
Though some partially acknowledged the difference, their overarching idea 
was that by creating a water market one can end the water woes that plague 
the city, and water scarcity was definitely a major infrastructure issue in 
burgeoning Bangalore. Such awkward and unexpected interrelationships 
have led to the rise of tensions, especially around basic amenities, that reflect 
deeper schisms in a social order that was already premised on caste and class 
hierarchies. The depth of neoliberalism, as Harvey writes, lies in the belief 
that "if markets do not exist (in areas such as land, water, education, health 
care, social security or environmental pollution), then they must be created, 
by state action if necessary" (2007: 2). The Water Project, in this case, was a 
13. Susan Leigh Sta r's work was perhaps the fir st to dwell on thi s subject directly. See Star 
(1999). 
14. "Infrastructure: Commentary from Nikhil Anand , johnathan Bach, julia Elyachar, and 
Daniel Mains," Curated Collections, Cultural Anthropology Online, November 26, 2012, available 
at http: //production.culanth.org/curated_collectionsl1l_ in frastructure/d iscussions/6-infrastruc 
ture-commentary-from-nikhil-anand-johnathan_bach_julia -elyachar-and-daniel-mains (accessed 
ja nuary 18, 2013). 
15. Ibid . 
16. See Dasgupta (2010) . 
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state-initiated infrastructure project, but it was based on the public-private 
partnership model. Studying water, which is considered sacred in the Hindu 
imaginary, in its reincarnation as commodity opened up a new dimenSion to 
explore how the market shifts the meaning of citizenship and belonging to 
the nation-state. The new notion of belonging was gradually linking citizen-
ship to consumption, where one can be acknowledged as a citizen only as a 
consumer of services and products. 
Treanor makes a compelling argument in this context, that neoliberalism 
is "the desire to intenSify and expand the market, by increasing the number, 
frequency, repeatability, and formalization oftransactions."17 To this formu-
lation I would like to add that the desire for a new normativity based on the 
market was ethnographically deep. As I started charting the Water Project, 
besides the middle class I came to know slum residents, or "urban poor" as 
they were officially categorized, who would be included in the new initiative. 
The urban poor were now being asked to pay toward the project cost, which 
was adjusted according to the square feet of their dwelling and also for the 
water they would eventually consume. The urban poor characterized these 
payments as "unacceptable demands" by the state since historically they re-
ceived free water as a public service to those below the poverty line. The resis-
tance to the market ideals started mounting as I began my work in the slums. 
Over the past decades, the involvement of NGOS and community-based 
organizations (CBOs) in development projects has become an established 
norm, which is often labeled as "participation" of the beneficiaries in making 
decisions about projects' designs and their implementation. International 
donor agencies, such as the World Bank, have been influential in setting this 
new paradigm in motion. Part of this initiative was meant to counter the 
critique of the top-down model of the projects. However, on the other side, 
with the spread of neoliberal values, the states in the developing world in-
creaSingly came to be portrayed as "corrupt" institutions with a severe lack of 
"transparency" and "accountability." This kind of dismal portrayal of public 
governance was disseminated by the agencies like the World Bank and was 
eagerly embraced by the rising middle class, particularly middle-class NGOs, 
who were looking for an ideological sponsor to confine the role of the state 
as a guarantor of the market economy. Scholars have noted the record rise of 
NGOs and CBOs recently in countries like India. Baviskar writes, "Among the 
social groups and associations that are considered to make up the civil society, 
NGOs have become especially prominent in the last two decades" (2001: 1). 
Thus, we need to ask whether we can substitute civil society in the Gram-
scian sense with NGOs' and CBOs' contributions. Though these organizations 
stand apart from and yet are able to impact the state, can they represent class 
17. Paul Treanor, "Neoliberalism: Origins, Theory, Definition," available at http: //www.web 
.inter.nl.net/users/Paul.Treanor/neoliberalism.html, 9 (accessed April 6, 2015). 
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interests equitably? Or do these emergences indicate a new form of class poli-
tics that is otherwise disguised in the name of the collective good? 
Sharma and Bhide (2005), examining the World Bank- funded Slum 
Sanitation Program (SSP) in Mumbai, have argued that the participation of 
the slum dwellers was minimal despite the involvement of well-established 
NGOs, such as the Society for the Promotion of Area Resource Centers 
(SPARC). I encountered a similar situation while working in the slums of 
Bangalore, where one resident commented, to the ironic amusement of others, 
"Yes, we will participate, because we are good at it." Therefore, rather than 
rushing to evaluate "empowerment" achieved through participation, which 
we often see in development agency reports, it is important to examine the 
politics of "participation" itself. 
Another recent issue that has surfaced in the development sphere is the 
increasing donor participation of countries like India, China, and Brazil, 
which were previously recipients of aid. As Emma Mawdsley has argued, the 
fracturing of what was previously a domain of the Western powers has led to a 
complex situation. She contends that this calls for a recalibration of "interna-
tional relations and political economy of development" along with a departure 
from the traditional analytical binaries such as "North-South," "East-Wesl ," 
"developed-developing," "First-Second-Thirds Worlds" (Mawdsley 2012: 3). 
Elsewhere I have argued that Janaagraha's participation in the Water Project 
was intended to delink participation from the sphere of development and 
claim it for the market (Dasgupta 2012). As I discuss later, Janaagraha was 
even reluctant to include the urban poor as a separate module in the participa-
tion structure. Their primary argument was "citizens" is already inclusive and 
does not necessitate a separation by class. They finally agreed to do so only 
when the Water and Sanitation Program (WSP) of the World Bank made it 
mandatory for them to receive the funds. Such reluctance to involve the poor 
based on class location or even labeling the Water Project as a "development 
project" within a donor-recipient country like India, Signals the contempo-
rary complexity of the field that Mawdsley discusses in her work. 
Based on the above theoretical framework, some questions that arose in 
my discussion with the slum residents were the following: What does it mean 
to pay to connect to the main water pipe? Isn't it part of the government's 
responsibility? Why do we have to pay for water now? What has changed? 
Is the government no longer going to take care of the poor? Finally, where 
is the water going to come from, since the river (meaning Cauvery) is so far 
away? These questions unequivocally displayed the core problems of market 
reforms. Together-the slum dwellers and I-were led to a space where the 
otherwise "impeccable" logic of the market endorsed by IT was fraying at 
the edges. Answers were difficult to come by, but the questions mattered. 
Even when some state actors were confronted with these questions, they were 
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befuddled. Contrary to the expectation of the IT narrative, the state was not 
receding or reincarnating itself to make way for the market. Rather, what was 
emerging was a state that was muddling through the new set of practices that 
had descended on it. 
My meeting with local councilors, who often used water to garner votes 
in the slums, revealed that they were grappling with the new ideology and 
government processes that they themselves barely understood. This was fur-
ther demonstrated in my work with the Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage 
Board (Water Board),1B a para-statal agency bestowed with the task of super-
vising the implementation of the project. In several meetings I attended at the 
Water Board, engineers who had years of experience working in the slums of 
Bangalore were hesitant about charging the urban poor for water. The urban 
poor, on the other hand, were deeply aware of this kind of predicament faced 
by administrators and elected councilors. Nikhil Anand, in his work on water 
supply in Mumbai settlements, argues that strategies to secure water invite 
us to "move beyond binary theorizations of haves and have-nots that are 
commonplace in writings about cities, especially those in the Global South" 
(2011: 543). To think of reassigning water as a commodity under privatization 
initiatives therefore is not merely about an added financial burden for the ur-
ban poor. Such changes further indicate the recession of final frontiers, water 
in this case, that long enabled the urban poor to engage, even minimally, in 
the power structure. The urban poor resistance to water privatization is not 
archaic; it is, as Raymond Williams helps us reflect, "residual." The residual 
is not "archaic" because it not "wholly recognized as an element of the past" 
(Williams 1977: 122). In bringing the urban poor within the ambit of my 
analysis, I want to suggest that despite their otherwise marginal locations, 
their resistance is constitutive of the neoliberal discourse. 
As I completed this manuscript, the contemporaneity that framed my ethnography somewhat changed. However, the changes, rather than 
negating, have come to reinforce the neoliberal system that I set out to study. 
There are four issues that I feel compelled to address to resituate this work. 
First, the current global economic downturn and its effect on the IT indus-
try in India; second, the increasing role of IT entrepreneurs like Nilekani in 
public governance and seeking public office and losing in the 2014 election; 
third, the increasing middle-class "capture of the state" that is congealing as 
a wider urban middle-class ethos rather than being confined to organiza-
tions such as Janaagraha; and, fourth, the 2014 election itself that catapulted 
the Hindu fundamentalist party, BJP, to power at the center by a 53 percent 
18. I still selectively use BWSSB while referring to formal acts and policies. 
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majority ending the coalition government phase, the norm -for some decades 
now. Apparently these events seem disconnected and somewhat contradictory 
because Nilekani's defeat may seem to be the demise of the IT ideology that 
endorsed the market for public governance. However, when we consider that 
Narendra Modi, the current prime minister of India and the leader of the 
BJP, won on a platform of the "Gujarat Model of Development," which favors 
the neoliberal agenda and is protective of what Modi himself has termed the 
"neo-middle class," a more complex picture of the market-based ideology 
emerges. The ideology now signals a wider emergence of a new middle-class 
"capture of the state" to endorse marketplace consumerism. Further, as I show 
in Chapter 3, while IT professionals may not endorse aggressive Hinduism, 
sympathies for a lighter version of Hindu nationalism, or "Hindutva Lite,"19 
was quite common, just like it is among middle-class India now. 
The recent global economic downturn has undoubtedly affected the IT 
industry in India since most of the clients of the industry are located in 
the United States and Western Europe. Based on these findings, The Hindu 
reported, "For the first time in 47 quarters, Infosys, hitherto the bellwether 
of the sector, missed its revenue growth guidance. Its guidance for 2012-13 
is just 8-10 per cent growth in U.S. dollar terms compared with the indus-
try association National Association of Software and Service Compar,ies' 
(NASSCOM's) guidance of 11-14 per cent."20 
Though Infosys reported increased revenue in the April-June quarter in 
2014, according to the International Business Times, the future projects of 
the company are not as promising compared with the past since the com-
pany reduced its earnings per share gUidance for 2012 to 2.97 from its $3 .03 
projection last year.21 The Wall Street Journal further reported that countries 
such as Indonesia, the Philippines, and Mexico pose a serious threat to the 
outsourcing industry in India.22 
Despite the economic slump, IT entrepreneurs continue to significantly 
carve out their space in public governance. As they had mentioned to me dur-
ing my fieldwork, both Murthy and Nilekani had keen interest in reforming 
the state and having India embark on a new path as a nation worth reckoning 
within geopolitics. Nilekani contested the 2014 election from the Bangalore 
South constituency on a Congress ticket but lost to his opponent, BJP can-
didate Ananth Kumar. In his speech, while conceding defeat, he pointed out 
19. I am grateful to one of the anonymous reviewers for suggesting this apposite term. 
. 20. "Uncertain Times Ahead for Indian IT Sector," The Hindu , available at http://www.the 
hll1du.com/todays-paper/tp-business/uncertain_times_ahead-for-indian-it-sector/art icle3440366 
.ece (accessed October 2014). 
21. Avai lable at http://www.ibtimes.comlindias-it-outsourcing_industry_faces-strain-global 
-economlc-downturn-853539 (accessed October 29, 2012). 
22. Available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304765304577478193970187 
310.html (accessed October 29,2012). 
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that "I am disappointed ... This is my first election. I've learnt a lot in this 
election ... I will not quit politics. I will continue working for the Congress. 
I will not only work for issues related to my constituency, but will continue 
working for Bangalore."23 His intention of engaging in public governance 
is not merely a matter of an election speech but points to his long-standing 
involvement with the state. 
In 2009 Nilekani stepped aside (not down) from his official corporate 
position in Infosys to serve as the chairman of the new Unique Identifica-
tion Authority of India (UIDAI). The UIDAI would implement the Aadhaar 
Scheme, to endow citizens with a unique identification number and also 
maintain a database of citizens' biometrics and other biographical data. The 
idea was originally proposed by Infosys as a governance tool, particularly by 
Nilekani, and it is thus not surprising that he was supervising the initiative. 
The Aadhaar number is a tracking device similar to the social security num-
ber in the United States, but the official narrative states that it is meant to ad-
dress election fraud and widespread embezzlement of funds that are especially 
targeted toward poverty alleviation. Tracking populations, in a Foucauldian 
framework, is a mark of govern mentality, and inducting an entrepreneur 
to administer the system is indicative of a deeper change in the notion of 
belonging and citizenship, something I argue in this book. Nilekani's role 
in the state now reiterates my central thesis to understand the extent of the 
IT success narrative beyond the domain of the industry. However, in 2014 
Nilekani stepped down as the chairman of the UIDAI to run for office in the 
nationwide elections. 
Nevertheless, Nilekani's involvement was not unprecedented. The in-
volvement of IT entrepreneurs in public governance has been an emerging 
social practice for nearly two decades now. For instance, the construction of 
the new airport was a major topic of discussion at Infosys while I was doing 
fieldwork mainly because Narayan Murthy was its chairman at that time. The 
old Hindustan Aeronautics Limited, or HAL, airport,24 which I used during 
my fieldwork, was located in the southeastern part of the city. Being of modest 
scope, it was able to handle a decent volume of air traffic. However, the new 
airport, which would be built outside the city, was intended to expand the ca-
pacity of air traffic in and out of Bangalore. It was promoted as a major stride 
in transforming Bangalore into a global city, and companies such as Larsen 
and Toubro, Siemens, and Unique Zurich Airport were consulted for the air-
port design. In 2005 Narayana Murthy resigned as the chairman after being 
criticized by H. D. Deve Gowda (former prime minister and then coalition 
23. Available at http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/news/Election-results·2014·I-concede 
-defeat-to-Ananth-Nandan-Nilekan i-says/a rticleshow/35227480.cms (accessed September 15, 
2014). 
24. Since 2008 the old airport has been used by HAL and the Indian air force for testing 
purposes only. 
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leader ofJanata Dal-Secular [JDS] with the Dharam Singh-led Congress) for 
the delay in the construction and also on issues ofland. The controversy over 
land allocation for the airport brought out issues that were related to land use 
in general for urban development. The Joint House Committee investigated 
the airport where Murthy, along with others involved, has been accused of a 
"poor quality of workmanship» and the absence of an ambience that reflects 
the specific "culture and glory of Karnataka» (Economic Times, December 22, 
2009). Even the discourse that framed his resignation is quite revealing. 
In a letter Murthy wrote to then chief minister Dharam Singh he men-
tioned his angst that the time and effort he had put in for five years were not 
acknowledged.2s What he did not reference in the letter or his press state-
ments was the related allegation JDS brought about Infosys's application for 
845 acres ofland in the peri-urban area of the city to expand its facilities. JDS 
wanted an investigation into how land was being distributed to IT companies 
and, based on that, whether Murthy was ethically qualified to represent the 
private wing of a public-private infrastructural project?6 At Infosys, Murthy's 
reSignation was construed as "unfortunate» not because it was seen as his loss, 
but because of the state's inability to retain and appreciate, as one engineer 
affectively put it, "an ethical and globally renowned entrepreneur who Wi13 
willing to go beyond his duties as a citizen to end corruption and serve the 
nation.» 
When I mentioned the land issue to the engineers, it was once again cast 
as the state's reluctance to appreciate IT's contribution to the nation. Murthy's 
chairmanship, as the IT industry justified, aligned well with his "mentor» 
pOSition to oversee innovative work both in Infosys as well as in public in-
frastructure. In terms of expertise, it is quite difficult to see the connection 
between the two-software and airport-other than that they are both based 
on neoliberal tenets. It was, however, known that since the airport would be 
a critical node in global capitalism, Narayan Murthy was the obvious choice 
considering his presence in worldwide business. However, Narendra Pani 
(2006) reminds us that the new airport was just one of many instances of the 
neoliberal urban reform agenda in Bangalore. The S. M. Krishna government, 
Pani argues, would identify a set of infrastructural projects and then locate 
private investors for them. This kind of approach is based on arriving at a 
technical fix rather than addreSSing collective urban issues. Therefore, land 
that was obtained as part of the airport project was based on market acquisi-
tion in place of eqUitable price. 
S. M. Krishna, especially in founding BATF, aggressively extended public 
governance to the private sector to reorganize the city. Nilekani, who headed 
BATF, worked alongSide Ramesh Ramanathan, an ex-banker from London 
25. Hindu Business Online, October 21, 2005. 
26. Ibid. 
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and New York, Devi Shetty, a prominent surgeon, and others to reform the 
urban infrastructure that would facilitate the flow of global capital. Janaki 
Nair has aptly described the coalition of IT entrepreneurs and other profes-
sionals charged with the new task of renewing Bangalore as the "captains 
of the new economy." She argues that the focus of reform was "roads rather 
than public transport, garbage and pollution rather than public housing" 
(2005: 336). Matthew Gandy (2008) has noted similar middle-class politics, 
particularly in reference to water supply in Mumbai. Gandy attributes the 
dismal state of water supply to the slums to the "extent to which the Indian 
state has been 'captured' by the middle classes so that its political agenda has 
been consistently diverted from the universal provision of basic services" 
(2008: 121). Added to this are middle-class "opt-out" strategies, such as bore 
wells, pumps, and tankers to access water outside the state provisions, and 
"environmental improvement," that is, to "clean up" the city for the "respect-
able citizens" (Gandy 2008). While the Hindu national Shiv Sena movement 
altered the urban landscape of Mumbai, in Bangalore, the middle-class "cap-
ture of the state" was especially emboldened by state representatives, such as 
S. M. Krishna. 
The middle-class "capture of the state" has become a constitutive phe-
nomenon in Indian polities visible in affective events such as the hunger 
strike by Kishan Babu Rao Hazare (better known as Anna Hazare) in April 
2011 to institute the Lokpal Bill (anticorruption bill) alongside the rise of the 
Aam Aadmi Party (AAP; Party of the Ordinary Man) formed in 2012.27 Both 
address the question of corruption and both involved overwhelming par-
ticipation by the urban educated middle class. The middle-class exasperation 
about state "corruption," the need for "transparency," and the involvement of 
citizens in public governance has strengthened over the years, with the AAP 
sweeping the Delhi Legislative Assembly Election in 2013, though they later 
lost the 2014 general elections. In the meantime, Janaagraha, an organization 
that proudly claims it is the "citizens' platform," had extended its work beyond 
Bangalore with Ramesh Ramanathan being named as one of the members of 
the Jawaharlal Nehru Urban Renewal Mission ONURM). The organization, 
among other things, now manages a nationwide initiative titled "I Paid a 
Bribe," where a person can anonymously report an incidence of corruption. 
The website offers a visual image of "India's Corruption Monitor," which dy-
namically calculates the total amount paid in bribes, the number of reports 
filed, and from which cities. The moral undertone is obvious; citizens and 
27. Arvind Kejriwal, a former civil servant in the Indian Adminis trative Services (lAS), was 
a prominent Right to Information (RTI) activist and a close associate of Kishan Babu Rao Hazare 
in that initiative. However, they later split over the question of political engagement through the 
electoral process, and Kejriwal went on to form the AAP. For a deta iled discussion of AAP, see Roy 
(2014). For an analysis of the connection between the Anna Hazare movement and the contempo-
rary middle class, see Sitapati (2011). 
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state officials who refuse to engage in bribery are adulated as "Bribe Fighters" 
and "Honest Officers," respectively.28 
However, one of the issues that remain constant in my work and in the 
work of other scholars who have examined urban middle-class activism 
is the dominance of the supposed middle-class value of "honesty" and the 
preeminence of the class based on education achievements. Roy, in analyzing 
the "party-building" strategies of AAP, writes, "Sooner or later (party workers 
would) return to the 'problem' of the slum voter," who, by participating in 
"vote buying" to mitigate their harsh conditions, are key to their own misery 
and, more importantly, in undermining the power of democracy (2014: 51). 
Like the Anna Hazare movement, where corporate employees participated 
widely, the AAP, whose leadership was often engaged in "management speak," 
and Janaagraha, as I show through my ethnography, were not only spaces 
marked by and for the educated middle class; the pedagogical and didactic 
mission to elevate the urban poor, with little effort to understand their social 
context, was an unwavering pursuit. Together, these indicate the preeminence 
of the middle class not simply as a growing consumer class but one that is 
invested, directly or indirectly, in the "capture of the state," which has mostly 
emerged from a sense of "minoritization and victimization" (Khandek r 
2013) by the Indian state despite being law-abiding and taxpaying "honest" 
citizens. 
Corruption was a dominant theme in the 2014 elections, especially re-
garding the incumbent Congress-led United ProgreSSive Alliance (UPA). The 
electoral pundits in the media and the BJP-led NDA (National Democratic 
Alliance) made recurring references to the coal scam, the 2G Spectrum provi-
sion, the commonwealth game fiasco, the Aadarsh Housing scam, and so on. 
The final victory of the BJP by a majority is therefore often attributed to the 
BJP's assurance of a corruption-free nation. However, Chhibber, along with 
his colleagues, has argued, "There is a crucial difference in how voters think 
about corruption and how political parties and leaders represent this issue 
in their campaigns. Voters care more about the corruption they encounter 
on an everyday basis, whereas parties make the issue a spectacle" (Chhibber, 
Shah, and Verma 2014). The everyday experience of corruption through which 
notions of the state congeals is well documented in ethnographic work, as 
well (Gupta 2005). Even when we look at the "I Paid a Bribe" initiative, the 
focus is not necessarily on larger scams but the mundane, everyday nature 
of soliciting, offering, or refuSing bribes. It is plausible that the everyday 
experience of corruption may have resonated with the larger anticorruption 
tenor of the BJP, which may have led to the win. Regardless, the urban middle 
class is the single most powerful mouthpiece against corruption considering 
28. Available at http: //www.ipaidabribe.com/bribe-trends#gsc.tab=O (accessed September 16, 
2014). 
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the perceived or real integrity of its members. Narendra Modi proactively 
attended to this constituency during his campaign. Later in July his govern-
ment's budget offered substantial concessions in income tax, savings, and 
housing loans that disproportionately benefited the middle class ("Onwards 
to the Neo-economy" 2014). 
The other related aspect of the 2014 general election was the definite and 
obsequious penchant for neoliberalism. Modi is supposed to have won by 
endorsing the "developmental" agenda, drawing on the "Gujarat Model of 
Development," the state where he was the chief minister.29 However, scholars 
like Jean Dreze (2014) have shown that when we consider Human Develop-
ment Indexes (child well-being, food, shelter, schooling, health care, sanita-
tion, and so on), Gujarat ranks nine out of the twenty in the state list, far 
behind Tamil Nadu and Kerala in the south. Gujarat, Dreze (2014) contends, 
is at best in the "middle" and definitely not the "model." Yet the question 
remains, as Soundaraya Chidambaram (2014) has pointed out: How does 
the electorate comprehend development-is it only a matter of GDP or are 
social inequities taken into account? It is my argument, which aligns with 
the ethnographic evidence that I present here, that the middle-class capture 
of the state has shifted the politics of governance and belonging in India to 
privilege public-private partnerships where the state is required to take a 
progressively minimal role. Returning to the 2014 budget, it has eased the 
flow of both foreign and domestic capital primarily through the promotion 
of public-private partnerships.30 Overall, the contemporary shifts further 
reinforce the economic and political processes that brought visibility to IT 
and organizations like Janaagraha. 
Finally, with BJP coming to power, a party that has strong ties with Hindu 
fundamentalist organizations, such as the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangha 
(RSS)/l dedicated to the promotion of Hindutva, the concern over whether 
India is now officially entering the "saffron" (color of Hindu nationalism) 
phase is legitimate. As an ideology, Hindutva was originally formulated 
by Vinayak Damodar Savarkar in 1923 as a treatise titled (then published 
anonymously) Hindutva: Who Is a Hindu. Hindutva, in Savarkar's exposition, 
is not necessarily a religious identity; it is a historical confluence of "Hindus, 
a Nation," a territory on the banks of the Sindhu' and a race united by the 
"Common Culture," the common Sanskriti (civilization). However, this bond 
between the land and the culture was interrupted by "foreign invaders," 
starting with the invasion of Muhammad of Ghazni in A.D. 1001, which led 
to the conversion of a segment of the population to Islam, who then irrevers-
29. Available at http://www.narendramodLin/the-gujarat-model! (accessed September 17, 
2014). 
30. See "Onwards to the Neo-economy" (2014) for a detailed discussion of the 2014 budget. 
3l. See http://www.rss.org for details about the organization. 
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ibly ceased to be part of the land (Jaffrelot 2007). Savarkar's "othering" of the 
Muslims is one of the prime tenets of Hindutva and underscores the fervent 
narratives and practices of the RSS and the BJP to quite some extent. 
Interestingly, Modi was strategically silent about Hindutva during his 
election campaign, instead highlighting the "development" plan. This has at-
tracted rather than distract scholars about the future of the nation since Modi 
is a certified RSS activist (Teltumbde 2014). Anand Teltumbde has argued that 
rather than taking the rigid approach, Modi is embracing a "soft approach 
towards Hindutva by systematically saffronising [sic] institutions, as he did 
in GUjarat," citing the instance of appointing Y. Sudershan Rao, a historian 
who is known to have sought the virtue of the caste system and determine 
dates of the epic Mahabharata (Teltumbde 2014: 11). Teltumbde also points 
out that Hindutva aligns well with neoliberalism, which he terms "Saffron 
Neoliberalism." Both are designed to privilege the already privileged, the 
Hindus and upper classes, respectively (Teltumbde 2014). The link between 
the urban middle-class Hindus, for instance, in Infosys and Janaagraha, and 
Hindutva is not the kind espoused by RSS, but it aligns rather well with Mo-
di's approach, which as I mentioned earlier, can be thought of as "Hindu tva 
Lite." During my ethnographic work I seldom encountered overt referenc:es 
to Hindutva, but the underscoring narrative upheld what was often seen as 
an intrinsic connection between Hinduism and science. The pride in the suc-
cess of IT among software developers in Infosys or middle-class activism in 
Janaagraha were anchored to a vision that had little space for the "other," the 
"other" being Muslims or the lower classes. In a national political context that 
assembles Hindutva, sCience, and the neoliberal market in an unprecedented 
synthesis, the shifting grounds of public governance that I document here 
have reached a new level oflegitimacy. 
T he ethnographic work for this book was based in Bangalore, but prior 
to starting the research, I had also considered Hyderabad as a potential 
site. Though other Indian cities feature in the success of the IT industry, 
the Bangalore-Hyderabad dyad is by far the most important because of the 
exclusive initiatives taken by Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh, the respective 
state governments. Bangalore nonetheless was historically connected to the 
science and technology imagination of the nation-building era following 
independence in 1947. TI10ugh the development of the IT industry was fi-
nallya matter of government policies both at the central and state level and 
entrepreneurial initiatives, Bangalore was already available as a space marked 
by infrastructural industries. These industries were established as part of 
the nationalist project for technological and scientific self-reliance. Before it 
became the "Silicon Valley of India," it was known as the "science capital" 
of the country for its public-sector industries such as the Indian Telephone 
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Industries (1948), Hindustan Machine Tools (1953), Bharat Electronics (1954), 
Hindustan Aeronautics (1964), Hindustan Copper (1967), and Bharat Earth 
Movers (1967). These industries, despite the decline of their standing after 
the advent of IT, are still present in the collective memory, both inside and 
outside IT, and they offer a preamble to the new industry. The city, as I discuss 
in Chapter 3, was also the erstwhile hub of multinational companies such as 
IBM, which left India in 1978 to return again in 1992. 
The 2004 election was decisive especially for urban renewal plans in 
Bangalore. S. M. Krishna, the chief minister of Karnataka and the architect 
of Bangalore as a global city, lost the election, and agony over his defeat was 
widespread both in Infosys and Janaagraha. His defeat was seen as a threat 
and a setback to the neoliberal agenda in Bangalore. When state power is co-
opted, compromised, and weakened, it calls for a critical definition of power 
that not only looks at the "capture" by the middle class but also at the subver-
sions the poor engage in to survive. The middle-class "capture" of the state is 
mainly justified as a necessary and ethical antidote to "corruption." However, 
as Gandy has contended, "The term 'corruption' .. . actually masks an array 
of different practices and needs to be more carefully differentiated" (2008: 
117). In the case of water supply, as Gandy also notes, practices that I have 
noticed range from bribing for prompt connections, additional payment for 
dedicated water lines (common for gated communities, which mention 2417 
water supply), illegal connections to the main water pipe, and so on. Though 
I have known these practices to be common both in middle-class neighbor-
hoods and slums, the middle-class engagement with "corruption" is suppos-
edly prompted by the failure of the state, whereas that of the urban poor is 
seen as downright illegal. Therefore, the task is to understand the practices 
and ideologies through which middle-class intrusion into governance can be 
honored as "reformative," while that of the poor is deplored as "delinquent."32 
The parochial commitment to urban renewal had implications beyond the 
city; it seriously affected the rural sector. S. M. Krishna's term also coincided 
with farmers' suicides in Karnataka, along with other states, which is usu-
ally linked to his eventual defeat in the 2004 elections. Based on the findings 
of the Madras Institute of Development Studies, a research organization in 
Chennai, The Hindu published comparative data in an opinion piece titled 
"Farm Suicides Worsen after 2001: A Study" in 2007.33 Karnataka ranked as 
one of the highest in the country for farmer suicides, leading us to recognize 
the unfortunate agrarian crisis unleashed by the commercialization of agri-
culture during the 1990s.34 
32. For a discussion on the anthropology of corruption, see Holler and Shore (2005). 
33. Available at http://www.hindu.com12007/ 11/13/stories/2007111352250900.htm (accessed 
April 12, 2013). 
34. For a detailed analysis of the farmers' suicide, see Vasavi (1999). 
24 Introduction 
Biotechnology is another important sector of the neoliberal plan in Ban-
galore. Lawrence Liang has written about farmers' protests against "biotech-
nology and the patenting of seeds and life forms." He specifically mentions 
the one organized by the Karnataka Rajya Raitha Sangha in front of KFC.35 
Vandana Shiva (2008) has argued extensively about farmer suicides in the 
context of seed monopolies introduced by corporations such as Monsanto. 
Shiva mentions four states-Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, and 
the Punjab-where especially farmers who grow cotton, a cash crop, suc-
cumbed. Citing the International Food Policy Research Institute's discussion 
paper "Bt-Cotton and Farmers' Suicide in India: Reviewing the Evidence," 
she argues that it completely misplaced the suicide events as a "long-term 
phenomenon" when these happened between 1997 and 2007, affecting nearly 
160,000 farmers.36 
Such misplaced narratives are especially troubling in cities like Bangalore 
where farmer suicides are incommensurable with the aspiring global image. 
The newspapers often reported Krishna visiting the farmer's family after the 
suicide, but the priority of his regime clearly abandoned the agrarian crisis. 
The overall silence around such suicides during my fieldwork was intriguing. 
The majority of people I talked to about the farmers' suicide perceived th,.:se 
as isolated problems, and very few even made a connection to the Krishna 
government's lopsided preference to reinforce urban governance. 
The collaboration between corporations and the state is not new in India. Other IT companies, which have a longer history with the Indian state in 
the pre-IT era, such as Tata Consultancy Services (TCS)37 and Wipro38 have 
also dedicated their profits to social causes through programs of corporate 
social responsibility (CSR). Infosys, like all the other corporations, has its 
own CSR, known as the Infosys Foundation established in 1996. The found a-
35. Available at http://www.tO.or.at/w io/downloads/india/liang.pdf (accessed October 22, 
2013). 
36. To see the distribution of farmers' suicide between 1995 and 2010, see http: //www. the 
hindu.com/multimedia/archive/00820/Farm_Suicides __ All __ 820602a .pdf and "In 16 Years, 
Farm Suicides Cross a Quarter Million," TIle Hindu , available at http://www.thehindu.com/opin 
Ion I colum nsls a in a th I in -16 -yea rs -farm -su i cid es- cro ss- a _ q uarter- million/a r ticle2 5 77 6 3 5. ece 
(accessed October 22, 2013). 
37. TCS was established in 1968 and is part of the Tata Group, which was founded by Jamsetji 
Tata 111 1868. After independence in 1947, the Tata Group was one of the main industrial con-
glol.nerates that invested significantly in infrastructural projects to participate and promote in the 
nation-buIlding project. 
38. Wipro, which was earlier known as Western India Products Limited, was established in 
1945 to manufacture and sell consumer products, especially household products such as Sunflower 
Vanaspati (c.ooking) oil, soaps, and so on. The company stepped into the hardware and software 
~T 1I1dustry 111 the 1980s and in the 1990s rose to global prominence along with other companies 
111 Bangalore. 
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tion, under the chairpersonship of Sudha Murthy, wife of Narayan Murthy, 
donates 1 percent of the company profit (after tax39 ) to the development of 
basic amenities in rural areas in Karnataka and neighboring states. Two issues 
led me away from focusing on CSR. First, I was not interested in isolated acts 
of altruism or benevolence because they rarely address social inequality as 
structural violence; rather often these programs perpetuate the status quo. In 
saying this, I am not suggesting that Infosys's critique of the state questions is-
sues of social injustice; rather it builds its ideology on existing forms of social 
inequality while attempting to introduce new ones through ownership and 
private property. However, the ethico-political critique that I am proposing 
here seeks a deeper political and economic transformation that is not limited 
to isolated attempts (building schools, hospitals digging wells, raising flood 
relief, and so on) to "help" the rural poor. 
The critique is an attempt to overhaul the governance apparatus in a spe-
cific way, that is, to replace the socialist-redistributive model with one based 
on the neoliberal market. Second, the Infosys-Janaagraha bond for trans-
forming governance was singularly focused on the city, which was seen as an 
important node in the circuit of global capital. One of Janaagraha's missions 
was to revitalize urban politics and the urban domain, which it argued had 
suffered because of state policies that privileged the agrarian economy and the 
rural sector. My inclusion of the Water Project alongside software illustrates 
this argument. The historical amnesia is deeply linked to the ethico-political 
critique because while attempting to reform the nation-state, the Infosys-
Janaagraha collaborative erases its past as problematic and burdensome. The 
claim I make in this book is not about interchanging Infosys with IT and then 
extending the argument to India as a whole. Instead I think ofInfosys as am-
ply reformative based on its corporate power, to be able to initiate changes in 
the government apparatus not only at the state level but also at the level of the 
central government. Nevertheless, this could only happen at a certain moment 
in the history of the nation-state, and my intention is to capture the politi-
cal nuances of that moment ethnographically. Therefore, this book explores 
emerging alliances that recalibrate the relationship between state and citizens. 
O ver the last two decades, the rise of IT in general, and in India spe-cifically, has generated significant interest among scholars across dis-
ciplines in the context of globalization, neoliberalism, its implications for 
transnational labor, and so on. Manuel Castells's (1989) "information SOciety" 
(informational economy, global economy, network enterprise, flexi-workers, 
timeless time, annihilation of time, space of flows) comes to mind; he offers 
39. This was specifically emphasized as I was learning about the Foundation during my field-
work. 
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us ways to theorize the restructuring of capitalism transformed primarily 
by the IT revolution in information processing. Other scholars have focused 
specifically on the Indian IT industry. For instance, in their edited volume, 
Carol Upadhya and A. R. Vasavi explore the various facets of the Indian IT 
industry at the intersection of culture, corporate management, the production 
of the Indian techie, labor processes, gender, and so on. In Virtual Migration, 
Aneesh Aneesh (2006) offers us a reading of the outsourced model of soft-
ware development as the decoupling of the "body" from its "performance." It 
generates, he argues, a different kind of temporal integration when servers, 
software engineers, and clients are differentially located across incongruous 
geographies and time zones. Christopher Kelty's (2008) Two Bits focuses 
on free or open-source software and how it leads to the emergence of what 
he calls a "recursive public." A recursive public is a specific kind of public, 
composed of "geeks" who are at the forefront of establishing a different kind 
of public space that contests existing forms of power. In terms of power, free 
software, which developed rather unexpectedly, counters all that is associated 
with economic history, especially with capitalism, such as "private ownership" 
and "individual autonomy." I knew a handful of geeks at Infosys who were 
committed to open-source software, which was quite in contradiction wi h 
the capitalistic mission of the company. TI10ugh my research does not focus 
on the politics of open source, Kelty's work was helpful for me to think about 
the politics that underscore software development work, such as the sharing of 
tacit knowledge. Kelty's work, unlike mine and like the other works I mention 
here, once again is multisited. In mapping a "distributed phenomenon ethno-
graphically," his work was spread over Bangalore, Boston, Berlin, and Houston. 
Another area of focus in this literature has been on gender. Men, espe-
cially in the upper echelons of companies, dominate the IT industry. This is 
immediately Visible, and the IT industry is marked by a gender inequity that 
is quite characteristic of the industry itself. The ideal software programmer 
is a man ideally without a family. If he is married, the wife is expected to be 
in a supporting role, helping the man climb the corporate ladder (Devi 2002). 
Women programmers I knew at Infosys often complained about managing 
long hours of commute, work, domestic responsibilities, and family obliga-
tions, especially toward in-laws. A few women also reported that to help them 
advance professionally, their parents were taking care of their children, who 
occasionally lived in other cities. Then there was the question of international 
travel to a client site, which most women were either not offered, had to pass, 
or had to accept along with the emotional cost of "abandoning" their chil-
dren. At the time of my fieldwork there was a conversation about opening a 
daycare for the employees' children at Infosys, but most of those meetings 
were organized and attended by women. The implication for gender equity in 
a neoliberal context that purportedly upholds individual pursuits is favorably 
skewed toward men. 
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Scholars such as Winifred Poster (2013), Danielle van Jaarsveld and Poster 
(2013), Reena Patel (2010), and Rupal Oza (2006) analyzed labor relations 
between the West and India as a function of time zone differences and their 
implications for questions of personhood, gender, and the circadian rhythm. 
Smitha Radhakrishnan's Appropriately Indian: Gender and Culture in a New 
Transnational Class "is about the culture ofIndia's IT professionals-a culture 
that powerfully reconciles the 'global' and the 'Indian' with one another to 
create a simplified, influential notion of a new Indian culture that is compat-
ible with the economic and geographic mobility of the global economy" (2011: 
3). The relationship between gender and neoliberalism has taken another 
critical turn with reports of violence against women who work late hours in 
the urban business processing outsourcing (BPO) companies, especially the 
call centers.40 This raises an important question about the enduring marginal-
ized place of women in an economy that is otherwise perceived to be enabling 
individual aspirations. On the other hand, because often the men accused and 
convicted in these violence cases are also from the lower class and/or rural 
migrants, the divide between the "progressive" city and the "regressive" vil-
lage grows exponentially. 
Gender's relation to water is an important feature in the literature. While 
I do not explore this specific connection, the fact that my ethnography on 
water dwells mostly on women is pertinent. In the face of water scarcity in 
the slums, women were largely responsible for collecting water for the family, 
and especially making sure that the men had enough water to use. This ranged 
from walking several miles to a public fountain to placing pots and buckets 
in the queue when water was released for the slum. Further, when we look 
into developmental projects like the Water Project, gender takes on a different 
character, an issue donor agency personnel often overlooked.41 During the 
meetings the Water Board held in the slums to explain the advantages of the 
Water Project, the voices and opinions of the male residents were most active 
and effective. Therefore, the chasm between the water chores and the power 
and decision making followed a strict gendered line.42 
Caste is another subject that scholars have explored in their examination 
of the IT industry. In my ethnography it was clear that the IT industry posi-
tions itself as an open forum, where success is based purely on achievement. 
Unlike traditional sectors where ascriptive status matters, IT is perceived to 
be based solely on "merit." However, the constitution of founders and employ-
ees at Infosys (and other companies) is Significantly dominated by the upper 
40. The Associated Chambers of Commerce and Industry in India released a report in January 
2013 highlighting declining fema le work productivity in the BPO sector. Available at http://www 
.assocham.org/prels/shownews.php?id=3843 (accessed October 20,2014) . 
41. See Coles and Wallace (2005). 
42 . For the politics of gender in the case of water, see Lahiri-Dutt (2006) and Coles and 
Wallace (2005). 
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castes (and upper class). In her study of software professionals in Bangalore, 
which examined educational opportunities available to upper-caste (and 
upper-class) urban citizens and recruitment strategies ofIT companies, Carol 
Upadhya (2004) showed that there is a critical gap between the IT rhetoric 
of "merit" and the actual reality.43 The exclusionary practices of IT has cer-
tainly expanded the middle caste-class beyond the traditional professions 
(professors, lawyers, doctors, engineers, and so on) but in the process has also 
deepened social inequalities.44 
While the above literature has shaped my thinking, my own query is 
somewhat different. What continues to be either explicit or implicit in the 
research is the idea that globalization exists as an intangible network that re-
cruits the nation-state as its appendage. I am not claiming that the network is 
prior to the nation-state or vice versa, where scholars also debate over the de-
mise or resurgence of state sovereignty. This is not a matter of succession, but 
of how the global network and the nation-state influence governance practices 
in the name of neoliberal reforms. In other words, how does one experience, 
endorse, or resist neoliberal changes in everyday life? My ethnography on the 
creation of the water market is meant to trace the processes through which 
people variously encounter its change from a basic amenity to a commod '(y. 
Saskia Sassen (2005) argues that the capacities for global operation, co-
ordination, and control contained in the new information technologies and 
in the power of transnational corporations need to be actualized. I extend 
Sassen's formulation to further argue that this embeddedness is not merely 
a question of actualizing place but also an invitation to historiography. In 
this sense the practices, discourses, and processes of neoliberal global capital 
cannot be detached from, to reference Michel Foucault, the "history of the 
present." The "history of the present" of IT is not about the historical back-
ground but how the past gets written into the present. Therefore, distinct from 
the scholars I am in conversation with, I attend to the question of globaliza-
tion, neoliberalization, and IT by visiting the postcolonial historiography. In 
fact, I argue that the postcolonial condition constitutes, deploys, and resists 
global forces in a way that is reminiscent of an earlier imperial past, a travail 
we cannot ignore. 
My interest in IT does not exclusively focus on its global network of 
flows of capital, software, and programmers. Rather, I am interested in its 
politics within the nation-state and how it bears on the issue of citizenship 
and belonging. Can this work be considered multisited? Though I remained 
i~ Bangalore, I did travel through disjunctive and incongruous spaces in the 
cIty. For example, a typical day in Bangalore involved a negotiation between 
43. For further discussion on how education plays a role in IT, see Krishna and Brihmadesam 
(2006) and Fuller and Naras imhan (2006, 2010). 
44. For a caste-class continuum, see Fuller and Narasimhan (2014). 
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the filth-logged storm drains in the slums and the opulent spaces of IT cor-
porations. Ethnography in such incommensurable spaces may be termed 
multitemporal because, in the IT discourse, it represents a linear progression 
from "backwardness" to "modernity." Contrary to its promises, neither glo-
balization nor neoliberalization has generated an even political terrain. By 
political terrain I mean the global as well as the national terrain. This work is 
an attempt to map the ruggedness of this uneven terrain as a way to show how 
the IT narrative differentially affects everyday lives of hierarchically placed 
populations. Ethnography is a particularly useful method in this enterprise 
because it compels the researcher to follow a story not for its cohesiveness but 
for its abundant missing pieces. 
The book is organized based on the following chapters. Along with an outline of the manuscript, the first chapter, "The Politics of Distrust," 
introduces the various sites in and through which I came to formulate the 
project, moving back and forth spatially among them rather than offering 
a chronology of events. Methodologically, these sites intertwine in terms of 
their shared investment in thinking about "India," "Bangalore," "citizenship," 
and "governance." Here I propose a heuristic binary tool-"inside" and "out-
side" IT-to show how these notions are constructed and contested along class 
lines. The inside ofIT is the domain of software development, where work and 
human processes intertwine to meet the stipulations of the global economy. 
The outside, however, is not merely what lies outside IT or is excluded from 
it. Rather, I deploy the "outside" as a way to reverse our gaze on IT. Therefore, 
instead oflooking outside from inside IT, the outside offers a critical analysis 
when we look into IT. The outside is where the Water Project is located, but it 
is also a multilayered and contested domain where different classes lay their 
claims to the city. The inside-outside is not a dichotomy that is sealed; it is the 
new porosity between the two otherwise unrelated domains, that is, software 
and water. These now converge in the neoliberal discourse and offer us a way 
to revisit the question of citizenship and belonging. 
Chapter 2, "Market Experiments and Peripheral Lives," discusses the 
basis of why I bring the two domains-water and software-under the same 
rubric of analysis. It explains how these domains become commensurate in 
thinking about citizenship and governance. I provide the details of the Water 
Project and explain how it is considered unprecedented in India in the area 
of public infrastructure work. For example, the citizens' contribution toward 
the capital cost and their participation in monitoring the project as one of 
the stakeholders are two of its unique features. It also discusses WSP's inter-
est in funding the "citizen participation" module and International Finance 
Corporation's insistence on privatizing the water supply. Interestingly, though 
the Water Board was administering the Water Project, the territory that was 
30 Introduction 
included, that is, the peripheral region circling the city of Bangalore known 
as Greater Bangalore (the area was later merged with the city), was technically 
beyond the limits ofBangalore Mahanagar Palike. I specifically highlight this 
peripheral region as an "available" space for neoliberal experiments. I show 
the parallels that emerge between a software/corporate project and a state/ 
public project where one's participation is circumscribed only as a worthwhile 
"stakeholder" in the market. 
"Software Nation," Chapter 3, explores the internal processes of the IT 
industry, focusing on several different units in Infosys that handle different 
segments of the job. It would be safe to consider this chapter as the ethnog-
raphy of IT. However, I extend this ethnography to decipher a "blueprint" of 
governance and citizenship that is pOSSibly emanating from within this do-
main. Through this ethnographic account, one encounters not only desirable 
and successful citizens but also ethical corporate governance practices that 
Infosys claims it closely adheres to. Here I mainly focus on the following set of 
questions: What are possible indicators through which we can recognize this 
blueprint, as Raymond Williams suggests, as "emergent" and "residual"? How 
are these new indicators constructed as a neutral body of governance tools 
that can seamlessly alternate between corporate and the public governance? 
What makes such alternations possible? Why now? 
I explore one aspect of the success narrative that I encountered regularly 
at Infosys-"We put India on the map"-in Chapter 4, "Travails of Time." 
This segment of the narrative is ahistorical in the sense that it frames IT as a 
sudden occurrence that not only marks India's departure from a troublesome 
colonial past but is also delinked from the "corrupt" postcolonial present. 
Chapter 4 interrogates this notion of departure and delinking. I show how 
despite all its claims, IT in fact folds in what we may call a "history of the pres-
ent" through a selective borrowing and denial of the past. Issues of belonging 
and citizenship are underscored by contestations through time; therefore, this 
chapter attempts to anchor IT in historiography, not to provide a historical 
background but to understand the changing terrain of the nation-state with 
the emergence of neoliberalism. I pay special attention to the reemergence of 
Gandhi as the new referent and the simultaneous demise of Nehru in the IT 
narrative to attend to the question of history. 
Chapter 5, "The Black Box," deliberates on how although the neoliberal 
reform agenda privileges the upper classes given their economic strength, the 
urban poor were omnipresent. Their presence had little to do with inclusion 
but was a question in itself: What is to be done with the poor? The poor were 
clearly "reSidual" yet persistent in disrupting the neatness of the neoliberal 
picture. DraWing on my ethnographic work in a slum in Bangalore, Manju-
nathanagara, which was part of the Water Project, ·the urban poor question 
was critical in two ways. First, Janaagraha devoted a Significant amount of 
time to what it called the "urban poor question," basically trying to incorpo-
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rate them within a framework that otherwise was designed for middle-class 
citizens to participate in the Water Project. Second, the urban poor them-
selves were resisting the payment that would be incumbent if water supply was 
privatized. Related to this, they would lose a vote-bargaining strategy with 
their local councilors. Through this chapter I show that the experience of neo-
liberalism is far from being a monolith and that the market is not necessarily 
a tool favorable for allocation of resources since it tends to homogenize the 
polity despite its clear discontinuities. As I mention in Chapter I, the urban 
poor on the "outside" of IT, in fact, lend us a different looking glass through 
which we consider the politics of the market reform. This chapter reverses our 
gaze on IT. It compels us to pause and think about how market reforms are 
reinforcing existing forms of inequality while instituting new ones. Finally, in 
the conclusion, "BITS of Belonging," I revisit the question of postcolonialness 
and the restlessness that marks its continued departure from a past that is 
degrading. The success narrative ofIT is one such instance that attaches itself 
to the neoliberal ideology to argue for the renewal of the nation-state. Yet, as I 
show, this renewal is limited in terms of who can now belong as a substantive 
citizen-that now one can only belong in bits. 
I call this book BITS of Belonging to tell a complex story of postliberaliza-
tion India, particularly how the disenfranchised population copes with the 
changing political paradigm and devises new strategies to make claims to the 
nation-state. This claim, as I see through my work, is a fractured reality-a 
binary of 0 and I-as in a computer BIT. Neither 0 nor 1 matter as entities; the 
various combinations of the two constitute a legitimate software program. The 
combination has a predetermined and limited field of possibilities. Likewise, 
belonging ceases to have an amorphous stance and becomes a definite combi-
nation of politics, ideology, and economics to be recognizable as a legitimate 
way to exist in the nation-state. Yet the urban poor contest this form of citi-
zenship as a way to continue their claim on the state. In this sense citizenship 
and governance are both a venue for reformation as well as a contestation. 
The success story of IT, despite its reassuring tone, serendipitously becomes 
a conduit to class politics that reflects that liberalization, or globalization, for 
that matter, is far from a panacea. 
